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Business Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978: An Analysis of Chapter 11 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,' the first major revi- 
sion of the bankruptcy laws in nearly forty years,2 became effec- 
tive on October 1, 1979.3 The Reform Act clarifies, simplifies, 
and modernizes the previous law, which had been unable to deal 
with the vast twentieth-century changes in the amount and 
treatment of debt. 
Although the Reform Act includes many important changes, 
this Comment will focus on perhaps the most significant sub- 
stantive change: the consolidation of chapter VII (railroad reor- 
ganizations), chapter X (corporate reorganizations), chapter XI 
(arrangements), and chapter XI1 (real property arrangements) of 
the former act into the single reorganization chapter 11 of the 
Reform Ad. 
As a background for review of chapter 11 of the Reform Act, 
the first Section of this Comment will briefly outline the history 
of the reform movement, the reasons for the Reform Ad, and the 
rudiments of the former reorganization chapters. The second 
portion will proceed through chapter 11 of the Reform Act, high- 
lighting the important changes and describing the reasons for 
and effects of these alterations. The final section will make some 
observations about the new act from the practitioner's point of 
view, since the Reform Act promises to involve more practition- 
ers than did the prior reorganization chapters. Because of the 
relatively limited use of the railroad reorganization chapter of 
the former act,' this Comment will not consider the changes in 
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in 11 U.S.C.A. $$ 101-151326 (West 
1979); 28 U.S.C.A. $$  151-160, 581-589, 771-775, 1471-1482 (West 1979)) See Spivey, 
Bringing Bankruptcy into Focus, 84 CASE & COM. 3 (1979). 
2. The previous law was essentially the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 
544, as amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). 
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, $ 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549. 
4. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Sub- 
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (pt. I),  
94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 36 (1976) (statement of Berkeley Wright) [hereinafter cited as 
Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings]. The statistics cited show a total of 24 railroad re- 
organizations since 1940. 
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that area. 
A. The Tremendous Increase in Bankruptcy Petitions 
In the last thirty years of available statistics regarding the 
use of the former act, there has been a phenomenal increase in 
petitions for bankr~ptcy.~ In 1975, the year preceding congres- 
sional hearings on bankruptcy reform, the number of cases filed 
reached a new peak. Over 250,000 cases were filed that year in 
all types of bankruptcy proceedings, representing more than 
double the other 117,320 civil cases filed in federal district 
$ 
Among the factors leading to this increase are the great reli- 
ance American businessmen and industrialists have placed on 
debt as a source of capital, and the equally great dependence of 
consumers on credit for the purchase of goods and services.' 
With the overwhelming increase in the amount of private debt 
outstanding in the American economy, it is no wonder that 
bankruptcies have increased so dramatically. 
The vast majority of bankruptcies are straight personal or 
consumer  liquidation^.^ Of all the chapter X, XI, XII, and XIII 
proceedings filed under the former act, the largest number were 
filed under chapter XIII, the wage earner rehabilitation plan.@ 
Business bankruptcies, however, are not only increasing numeri- 
cally, but are also accounting for a larger percentage of all bank- 
5. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  THE BANKRUPTCY 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137 (pt. I), 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  BANKRUPTCY LAWS]. 
6. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4 ,  at 337 (statement of Vern 
Countryman). 
7. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION N CONSUMER FINANCE, REPORT ON CONSUMER CREDIT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 5-7 (1972). 
8. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4 ,  at 337 (statement of Vern 
Countryman). 
9. Id. In 1975 about 90% of all chapter proceedings were filed under chapter XIII. 
chapter XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41,178 cases in 1975 
chapter XII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  280 cases in 1975 
chapter XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3,506 cases in 1975 
chapter X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  189 cases in 1975 
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mptcies filed,lO consuming a significant portion of court time and 
other resources of the bankruptcy system. 
Despite the ever growing number of bankruptcies, their ad- 
verse economic impact is small when compared to the increased 
standard of living that credit buying has given the consumer.ll 
The cost is spread among all consumers, although the greatest 
burden is borne by "customers of business borrowers, through 
higher prices."12 
The spiraling number of bankruptcies is not so much a 
problem for the economy as it is for the bankrupt individuals 
and the bankruptcy court system.13 The need for reform, there- 
fore, did not center on the reduction of the number or dollar 
amount of bankruptcies. l4 Rather, the need focused on flexibility 
in the fair and equitable treatment of all parties, whether debtor 
or creditor, as well as on the expenditious and streamlined han- 
dling of an ever-increasing case load.15 
B. The Inadequacy of Former Bankruptcy Legislation 
With these needs in mind, Congress in 1970 established the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.16 The 
Commission was to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend 
changes" in the Bankruptcy Act and the system of bankruptcy 
administration.17 In July 1973 the Commission reported its find- 
ings and recommendations to Congress, including the text of a 
suggested bankruptcy code. 
The Commission concluded that the former act did not 
achieve the desired purposes of bankruptcy legislation.18 One 
commentator summarized the purposes as follows: 
The purpose of bankruptcy from the point of view of the 
10. Id. Business bankruptcies hovered below 10% of all bankruptcies from 1946-1974. 
In 1975, however, their portion of the total was 12%. 
11. Id. at 341.. 
12. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 40 (1971). This 
study was published by the Brookings Institution and is known as the "Brookings 
Report ." 
13. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 341 (statement of Vern 
Countryman). 
14. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION N BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 5, at 9. 
15. Id. at 11-12. 
16. The Commission was established by S.J. Res. of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91- 
354, 84 Stat. 468, as amended by S.J. Res. of Mar. 17, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-251, 86 Stat. 
63, H.R.J. Res. of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87 Stat. 140. 
17. Id. 
18. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
964 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
man deeply in debt, is relief. The purpose of bankruptcy from 
the point of view of the creditor is to salvage some recovery 
where it appears that the debt cannot or will not be paid in 
full. The purposes of bankruptcy from the point of view of the 
public are: (1) to return to useful production a man so harassed 
by debt that he cannot do his work properly, and (2) to divide 
fairly among the man's creditors such assets as he has? 
One study, the Brookings Report, found that under the for- 
mer system creditors received little from bankruptcy proceedings 
and consequently they had little incentive to actively pursue 
their claims. Instead, creditors passed their losses on to consum- 
e n  and taxpayers in the form of higher prices or tax writeoffs. 
The debtor, on the other hand, was often denied a "fresh start" 
because of the large number of nondischargeable debts and se- 
curity interests in essential property. Also, the debtor was often 
persuaded to reaffirm many of the debts discharged, either to ob- 
tain further credit or out of a sense of moral duty.20 
The Commission found a general lack of uniformity in the 
application of bankruptcy law; similarly situated debtors were 
accorded unequal treatment in various judicial districts.21 Con- 
cerning this problem, the Brookings Report stated: "Even among 
the federal bankruptcy courts there are striking differences in 
policies. "22 
With respect to business bankruptcies, the Commission's 
findings showed that inordinate delay in the institution of pro- 
ceedings was a major factor in the failure to meet creditor needs. 
Often the debtor's assets were largely depleted before bank- 
ruptcy. The requirement that a creditor prove an act of bank- 
ruptcy prior to filing an involuntary petition contributed to a 
general diminution of the value of a business, which generally is 
already depleted because of debtor delay in seeking help? The 
Commission found the business rehabilitation chapters to have 
"detailed and overlapping rules regarding [their] availability 
which frequently produce pointless and wasteful litigation as to 
which chapter should be used in a particular case. . . . In addi- 
tion, none of the chapters is precisely suited to the needs of 
many common business  situation^."^^ In sum, the Commission 
19. 1 D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 4 1 (2d ed. 1978). 
20. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 12, at 59-61. 
21. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 4. 
22. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 12, at 2-3. 
23. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 14. 
24. Id. at 23. 
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found the former act disjointed, inflexible, and confusing. De- 
spite frequent amendments, it was incapable of adapting to the 
many changes in debtor-creditor relations that have occurred 
since the former act's last major overhaul forty years 
C. The Former Reorganization Chapters 
Reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, is premised on 
the theory that the assets of a business are more valuable when 
continued in the productive capacity for which they were made 
than when dismantled and sold piecemeal for use in another 
business or for scrap. Liquidation is preferable only when the as- 
sets have little value as a continuing business relative to their 
liquidation value, or when it is more economical to divert the use 
of the assets to another form of productive ~apacity.~' 
Under former law, business reorganization was completed 
under three separate and mutually exclusive chapters,27 and the 
application of the chapters was determined by the "needs to be 
served."28 Chapter X was enacted in 1938 as a part of the Chan- 
dler Act to efficiently accomplish, by voluntary or involuntary 
petition, the thorough financial reorganization of large, publicly 
held corporations. It required rigid supervision by the court and 
was a formal process involving (1) the substitution of an inde- 
pendent trustee for debtor's management if total debt exceeded 
$250,000; (2) the active participation of the Securities and Ex- 
change Commission (SEC); (3) court approval of a plan prior to 
the solicitation of acceptances; (4) the ability to affect the rights 
of both secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and stockholders; 
and (5) the administration of the absolute priority rule with re- 
spect to participation in the assets of the business? Use of chap- 
25. Id. a t  1-5. Since the Chandler Act in 1938, see note 2 supra, debtor-creditor rela- 
tions have been greatly altered by the general adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
Truth-in-Lending Act regulations, or other similar legislation. 
26. Comment, SEC Intervention in Corporate Rehabilitation, 56 NEB. L. REV. 635, 
636 (1977). 
27. 11 U.S.C. § §  501-676 (chapter X), 701-799 (chapter XI), 801-926 (chapter XII) 
(1976) (repealed 1978). 
28. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956). 
29. J. TROST, L. KING & K. KLEE, THE PROPOSED FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT, 
RESOURCE MATERIALS 273 (1978). Chapter X also contemplated a complete reorganization 
of the capital structure of the debtor corporation with the new structure based on a go- 
ing-concern valuation of the enterprise, secured and unsecured creditor's interests being 
proportionate to the value of their claims. See Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, Supra 
note 4, at 339-40 (statement of Vern Countryman). The plan formulation was supervised 
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ter X was lirnited,'O primarily because of the mandatory ouster of 
the debtor's management and the application of the absolute 
priority rule; also, the formal nature of the proceedings tended to 
lengthen the reorganization process, which increased the costs 
and often resulted in little return to the  creditor^.^^ Thus, even 
though chapter X was more versatile than other chapters as to 
what debt could be affected in the reorganization, it was used in 
less than ten percent of all business reorganization 
Chapter XI, also added to the former act by the Chandler 
Act of 1938, was intended for use by smaller nonpublic busi- 
nesses. Because of its relatively quick reorganization procedures, 
however, it was more often used by larger public companies 
when a speedy reorganization process was imperative. A chapter 
XI case was commenced by the filing of a voluntary petition by 
any person who could file as a bankupt under section 22 of the 
former act,33 which defined those who could declare bankruptcy. 
One reason this chapter was so often employed is that debtor's 
management was not displaced by an independent trustee. The 
plan, which could only be proposed by the debtor, could directly 
affect unsecured debt only. Secured debt was often indirectly af- 
fected by the automatic stay provisions and by negotiations be- 
tween debtor and secured creditors. Negotiation was made more 
attractive to creditors by the possibility of a higher or more rapid 
payment on the debt than would have been available under the 
longer, more expensive chapter X proceeding." Since there was 
no court approval required for acceptance solicitation, it could 
be done either pre-petition or post-petition. The standard im- 
posed by the courts in confirming the plan was the "best inter- 
ests of creditors" test, which meant that to be approved, the 
plan must provide creditors with at  least what they would have 
by the trustees and had to be approved by the court before it could be submitted to the 
stockholders for their approval. Acceptance required approval by two-thirds majority in 
each class of claims affected and by a majority of stockholders affected. 
30. The limited application of chapter X is demonstrated by the fact that of 254,484 
bankruptcies filed in the United States in 1975, only 189 were filed under chapter X. See 
Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 337 (statement of Vern 
Countryman). 
31. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH supra note 12, at 144-46. 
32. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supm note 4,  at 337 (statement of Vem 
Countryman). 
33. 11 U.S.C. §§  22, 706(3) (1976) (repealed 1978). 
34. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, The Proposed Bankruptcy Reorganization Provi- 
sions: A Comparison of the Current Law with Chapter 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, 18 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 583-84 (1978). 
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received under a liquidation of the business.35 This conceivably 
left the difference between the liquidation value and the going- 
concern value for the debtor (stockholders, partners, or others) .36 
The SEC involvement was limited to that of a party in interest 
with authority to petition for a conversion to a chapter X pro- 
ceeding or for a complete dismissal where, in the SEC's opinion, 
the "needs to be served" so required.37 
Because of a limited scope, chapter XII, like chapter X, was 
rarely used." It was available only to noncorporate entities that 
owned property held as security for a debt. The primary purpose 
required of a chapter XII plan was modification of the real prop- 
erty secured debt, but it could also affect unsecured debt.3e Only 
the debtor could propose the plan and, to be confirmed, it was 
required to be in the "best interests of creditors." Such a case 
was thus commenced by a voluntary petition only and usually 
contemplated leaving the debtor in possession; however, on ap- 
plication by a party in-interest and for cause shown, the court 
could appoint a trustee.40 Solicitation of acceptances for a plan 
was permitted anytime, since, like under chapter XI, court ap- 
proval of plans was not required. The SEC could not be involved 
in a chapter XII proceeding. 
Chapter distinctions in business reorganizations long ago 
lost their justification, if indeed any existed in 1938. The estab- 
lishment of separate chapters at that time may have been largely 
attributable to the inability of Congress and the bankruptcy bar 
to agree on a uniform approach to reorgani~ations.~~ Chapter X 
was normally too time consuming and rigid, while chapter XI 
was limited to unsecured debt and contained too few public pro- 
tections. Chapter XI1 had limited applicability and could not be 
used by corporations. Although each chapter had separate ad- 
vantages that ought to have been available to all business enti- 
ties seeking rehabilitation, there could be no mixing of remedies 
among chapters. The consolidation of these chapters into a sin- 
35. 3 D. COWANS, supra note 19, $ 936. 
36. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 95-5951. 
37. 11 U.S.C. $ 728 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
38. For the number of chapter XII petitions filed in 1975, as well as the number of 
petitions filed under the other business reorganization chapters, see note 9 supra. 
39. Anderson, A Practioner's Guide to Financial Rehabilitation Through Chapters 
X-XIII of the Bankruptcy Act (pt. I) ,  24 LA. B.J. 203-207 (1976). 
40. 11 U.S.C. $$  832, 844 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
41. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 223. 
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gle chapter in the Reform Act, together with some much-needed 
modernization and simplification, was a great step forward in 
the uniform application of bankruptcy law. 
A. General 0 bservations 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 consti- 
tutes a major overhaul of chapter proceedings. While it most 
closely resembles chapter XI of the former act, the new chapter 
11 also represents a major innovation as it combines the advan- 
tages of the former chapters and introduces several new con- 
cepts." It is flexible enough to permit the fashioning of a proper 
remedy to fit the circumstances of individual cases, yet provides 
sufficient protection of public investors and creditors to prevent 
unworthy debtors from avoiding debt obligations. Its streamlined 
procedures resolve previous problems of unworkable and overlap- 
ping requirements among the different chapters, thereby working 
toward the elimination of needless litigation and the hazards of 
improper chapter selection. Reorganizations under the new chap- 
ter 11 will consume less time, promote greater equality of treat- 
ment among parties, retain more assets for the satisfaction of 
debts, and because of its simplified format, will allow more prac- 
titioners to bring cases under it. "The net effect of the series of 
reorganization principles is to retain the simplicity of an ar- 
rangement with unsecured private creditors while, at the same 
time, to make the more complex reorganization less cumbersome 
and quicker to process. "43 
B. Major Changes Introduced by t k  Bankruptcy Reform Act 
I .  Eligibility of debtors 
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act enumerates the 
requirements for relief under the Act.44 Basically, any individual, 
partnership, or corporation residing in the United States or hav- 
ing a domicile, a place of business, or property within this coun- 
try is eligible. The Reform Act retains the former act's exclusion 
of both foreign and domestic insurance companies, banks, and 
42. King, The New Bankruptcy Code: Many Improvements Over Earlier Law, NAT'L 
L.J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 26, col. 1. 
43. J. Tms~, L. KING & K. KLEE, supra note 29, at 279. 
44. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 109 (West 1979). 
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savings and loan associations, and there are specific provisions 
for the treatment of railroads in subchapter IV of chapter 11. 
With these few exceptions, any entity is eligible for relief under 
the Reform Act. 
*The adoption of these broad eligibility standards for all enti- 
ties seeking rehabilitation rather than liquidation provides more 
uniform application of the laws, greater flexibility as to reme- 
dies, and eliminates the hazards of improper chapter selection.45 
Contrary to the restricted and exclusive relief available under 
the various chapters of the former act, the Reform Act provides 
the entire panoply of remedies to all applicants regardless of 
size, amount of stock outstanding, or other distinguishing 
fact01-s.~~ 
2. Commencement of a chapter 11 case 
The Reform Act provides for both voluntary and involuntary 
petitions." A voluntary petition is commenced by the filing of a 
petition with the bankruptcy court by one who may be a debtor 
under chapter 11." Such a filing constitutes an order for relief. 
An involuntary petition may be commenced only under 
chapters 7 or 11 and only against certain entities.49 When there are 
twelve or more total creditors and their claims aggregate $5000 
more than the value of the liens securing their claims, three 
petitioning creditors must join to file a petition. If there are fewer 
than twelve creditors, only one need sign the petition if that 
creditor holds claims totaling at least $5000.50 The petition filed 
must allege that the debtor is generally not paying his debts as 
they come due or that within 120 days prior to the petition a 
a 
custodian was appointed or took possession of the debtor's 
property. The debtor must controvert the petition in a timely 
manner or relief is granted. If he does controvert the petition, a 
45. See, H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, a t  224. 
46. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 34, at 582. 
47. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 9 301, 303 (West 1979). 
48. Id. 9 301. 
49. Id. Q 303(a). The entity must be able to be a debtor under the chapter under 
which the case is commenced and the entity may not be a "farmer or a corporation that 
is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation." As for what is meant by the 
phrase "not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation," the report of the House 
Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 322, explains that eleemosy- 
nary institutions such as churches, schools, and charitable organizations and foundations 
are meant to be excluded. 
50. 11 U.S.C.A. Q 303(b) (West 1979). 
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trial is held to determine the debtor's viability? 
The Reform Act draws upon the provisions of former chapter 
X regarding involuntary petitions, but changes the conditions of 
both the voluntary and involuntary petitions. Most of the differ- 
ences deal with relaxation of the eligibility restri~tions.~~ 
The allegations necessary for the court to grant an order of 
relief are new. Proof of one of the acts of bankruptcy53 is no 
longer required. Alleging and proving an act of bankruptcy under 
the previous law often delayed the institution of proceedings un- 
til the business was beyond help." Although these acts have 
been abolished and a creditor's burden of proof made less oner- 
ous, the court may still require the posting of a creditor's bond to 
compensate the debtor for damages should the court later deter- 
mine that the petition was u n ~ a r r a n t e d . ~ ~  
3. Administration of the debtor's estate 
a. Creditor's committees. After the order for relief, the 
court must appoint a committee of unsecured creditors and may, 
upon request of a party in interest, appoint other committees 
from ampng other types of claimants. The size or membership of 
any appointed committee may be challenged by a party in inter- 
est and changed after notice and hearing if it is determined that 
the committee is not fairly representative of the claims it was 
meant to r ep re~en t .~~  
At a meeting where a majority of the committee is present, 
each committee may, with the court's approval, authorize the 
employment of attorneys, accountants, or other professionals to 
perform services in its behalf. The professionals so employed are 
prohibited from simultaneously representing any other entity in 
the case by a "disinterestedness" requiredent." They may be 
compensated from funds of the estate after a court hearing to 
51. Id. 8 303(h). 
52. For example, with an involuntary proceeding available to creditors of all poten- 
tial chapter 11 debtors, an individual proprietorship, a partnership, or other business 
entity may now, be confronted with an involuntary petition. This affords greater protec- 
tion to creditors, who may use this new leverage to force a debtor into reorganization 
before he becomes hopelessly insolvent or to negotiate concessions from the debtor in the 
formulation of a plan. 
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1976) (repealed 1978). 
54. REPORT OF THE COMMLSSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 5, at 14. 
55. See 11 U.S.C.A. 5 303(e), (i) (West 1979). 
56. Id. 9 1102. 
57. Id. 4 1103(a)-(b). 
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determine the amount, which is to be based on a reasonable 
compensation standard? Limitations and guidelines on compen- 
sation are specified in the Act.5g 
All appointed committees may actively participate in the re- 
organization process. They may investigate the financial condi- 
tion and operation of the debtor's business, determine the desira- 
bility of the continuation of the business, consult with the debtor 
in possession or the trustee concerning the administration of the 
case, participate in plan formulation, request a trustee or exam- 
iner, and generally pursue the interests of those they represent? 
The committees have standing to be heard on any issue, includ- 
ing a right to appeal an unfavorable court order, and they may 
also file a plan if the debtor fails to propose or obtain a confirma- 
tion of his plan." These committees are an important part of the 
reorganization process, since much of the negotiation that occurs 
between the debtor and creditors is accomplished through them. 
The Reform Act is premised on the notion that effective 
creditor participation and control, as opposed to lawyer and larg- 
est creditor control, will better achieve the purposes of reorgani- 
zation." Under prior law the committees were generally elected. 
Provisions specifically allowed the creditors with the largest 
claims and the highest priorities to dominate the committee 
while those with smaller claims and lower priorities were often 
excluded." An attorney was permitted to represent a particular 
creditor and a committee as well, often increasing the influence 
of the large creditors or, a t  least, permitting the attorney to 
dominate the committee and weaken creditor control. 
b. Appointment of a trustee or examiner. Section 1104 of 
the Reform Act, dealing with the appointment of a trustee or an 
examiner, constitutes a departure from former law. The former 
chapter X mandated the appointment of a trustee in every case 
where total debt exceeded $250,000" (this would include nearly 
every case for which chapter X had been used), and former 
58. Id. 8 330(a). 
59. Id. $ 8  328, 330, 331. Foremost among these limitations is that any compensation 
received is subject to court approval. Employment may be on any reasonable terms, in- 
cluding a retainer, an hourly fee, or a contingent fee. The court may deny a fee altogether 
if it finds the party is not disinterested. 
60. Id. 8 1103. 
61. Id. # §  1109, 1121. 
62. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 235. 
63. King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the Roposed Bankruptcy 
Code-or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI & XII, 78 COM. L.J. 429, 431-32 (1973). 
64. 11 U.S.C. 8 556 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
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chapter XI had no provision for the appointment of a trustee ex- 
cept the continuance of one appointed under another section? 
Former chapter XI1 left the debtor in possession in nearly all 
cases, except where a trustee was appointed under a prior filing 
under another chapter or where, for good cause, the debtor was 
replaced by a trustee.66 
The Reform Act takes an intermediate position. It contem- 
plates the debtor being left in possession in most cases, but pro- 
vides for a trustee or an examiner upon certain conditions. This 
reflects the belief that since in most cases there is no misman- 
agement or fraud, the debtor, who is most familiar with his busi- 
ness and his creditors, should retain possession." 
Ousting a debtor's management in favor of a trustee requires 
notice and a hearing at which a party in interest must show 
fraud, incompetence, or gross mismanagement, or demonstrate 
that such an appointment would be in the best interests of the 
creditors, the stockholders, or the estate. If a trustee is not ap- 
pointed, the court may, as an added protection to the creditors, 
order an examiner to investigate allegations of fraud and other 
irregularities if the debtor's unsecured nontrade and nontax 
debts exceed $5,000,000, or if otherwise warranted.6s Signifi- 
cantly, however, there are no provisions for the appointment of a 
receiver .69 
A trustee, or a debtor in possession, is entrusted with vari- 
ous powers and duties, including the investigation of all matters 
relevant to the case, the formulation and filing of an appropriate 
plan, the filing of all necessary reports and statements, and the 
continuation of the operation of the debtor's business.70 Other 
more general powers accorded the estate or the trustee are delin- 
eated in broad provisions of other chapters of the Reform Act." 
65. Id. 8 732. 
66. Id. §§ 732, 832, 844. See also 3 D. COWANS, supra note 19, 4 1055. 
67. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 233. 
68.. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 1104(b) (West 1979). 
69. King, supra note 42, at 26, col. 2. 
70. 11 U.S.C.A. § §  1106-1108 (West 1979). 
71. Proper execution of the duties of a trustee, or a debtor in possession, requires an 
understanding of several significant sections of chapters 3, 5, and 7 as they apply to 
chapter 11. See id. $ 4  323, 326, 345, 361-365, 521-554, 704. 
Although not technically within the scope of this Comment, certain changes from the 
previous law involving these provisions affect chapter 11 rehabilitation and are therefore 
mentioned. The first are the automatic stay provisions of 4 362 of the Reform Act. Id. § 
362. The changes were meant to correct two main inadequacies: incomplete coverage 
from the debtor's point of view, and lack of provision for relief from a stay from the 
creditor's point of view. Under 4 362 the automatic stay operates against all entities, 
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Proper use of the powers vested in a trustee or debtor in posses- 
sion should permit the reorganization of any truly viable 
business.72 
c. The equipment financing provisions. One of the more 
significant, albeit controversial, sections in the Reform Act is the 
provision covering aircraft equipment, vessels, and railroad roll- 
ing Under the former law, exceptions to the automatic 
stay provisions relating to transportation equipment allowed the 
owner or financer of heavy and expensive equipment, stock, or 
vessels to repossess according to the terms of the financing agree- 
ment, regardless of the commencement of bankruptcy proceed- 
ings. By providing for "bankruptcy-proof' agreements, these ex- 
ceptions were designed to encourage the production and 
financing of that type of property. The financing industry has 
become dependent on this practice, and has alleged that it 
would cease to operate in the absence of those  exception^.'^ Un- 
fortunately, the continued use of this equipment may be essen- 
tial to the operation of a debtor's business, and may be critical 
to successful re habilitation. 
The Reform Act modifies but does not eliminate the 
financer's absolute right to repossess. The trustee has the right 
to agree, within sixty days after the date of the order for relief, to 
whether judicial or administrative (with certain common exceptions listed in 8 362(b)). 
This coverage will allow the debtor enough time to formulate a rehabilitation plan free 
from the harassment of collection efforts. 
But the stay provision also allows a creditor to obtain relief from the stay if, after 
notice and hearing, the court finds the creditor's interests will be harmed due to a lack of 
adequate protection for the collateral. See id. 5 363. The court must act with reasonable 
dispatch as well, since the stay is dissolved automatically after 30 days from the credi- 
tor's request for relief unless the court, after notice and hearing, orders its continuation. 
There are also some significant changes from the previous law concerning property of 
the estate. Under the former act, state law determined what property passed to a trust 
for purposes of estate administration and whether or not such property was exempt. This 
policy was rejected in the Reform Act, in favor of a uniform list of exemptions and a 
single definition of property, id. 8 541, which will include any property interest of value. 
The exemption provision, id. 8 522, will prevent the disparities found under former law, 
and should provide the debtor with a "fresh start." 
Preferential transfer rules have also been altered by the Reform A d  by increasing 
the trustee's ability to recover funds for the estate. Id. 8 547. The two major changes are: 
(1) the preference period is now 90 days instead of the previous four months, and (2) 
insolvency is presumed to exist for 90 days prior to filing of the petition instead of the 
prior requirement of knowledge (actual or constructive) of the debtor's insolvency. These 
changes will especially affect trade lending and secured transactions, but will also alter 
the size of the estate to be reorganized in many cases. 
72. J. TROST, L. KING & K. KLEE, supra note 29, a t  299. ' 
73. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 1110-1168 (West 1979). 
74. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 239. 
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perform the debtor's obligations under the financing agreement. 
He may also agree to cure any default occurring before the order 
for relief within the sixty-day period and to cure any default oc- 
curring after the order within thirty days after such default. 
Only if the trustee fails to comply with these conditions may the 
financer repossess according to the agreement.75 
4. The plan 
The filing of a reorgainzation plan is governed by subchapter 
11 of chapter 11, which contains several significant changes from 
the former law. These changes may best be understood by an- 
swering six important questions with respect to the reorganiza- 
tion plan: (a) Who is eligible to file a formal plan? (b) What 
claims may the plan affect? (c) How may solicitation of accept- 
ances be conducted? (d) What classes of interests must accept 
the plan, and what percentage constitutes acceptance by class? 
(e) What standards must the court apply in determining whether 
or not to confirm the plan? (f) What is the effect of a confirmed 
plan? 
a. Who is eligible to file a formal plan? Under the former 
act, eligibility to file a formal plan varied under the different 
chapters. The formulation of a plan under chapter X was re- 
stricted to the trustee. The debtor and creditors were limited to 
negotiating with and suggesting plans to the trustee.'Vhen the 
trustee presented a plan, an approval hearing was held at which 
the plan was reviewed to determine whether or not it met confir- 
mation standards. If approved, the plan was sent to the SEC for 
a report and subsequent approval or objection. These require- 
ments were meant to protect the public investor, but made the 
process very lengthy, and deprived the creditors and debtor of 
active participation. 
Former chapter XI contemplated that only the debtor would 
file a plan." The creditors' only alternative to acceptance was to 
refuse their consent, thereby forcing renegotiation, dismissal, or 
perhaps liquidation. The disclosure of information to creditors 
was not closely monitored and was often minimal. Former chap- 
75. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1979). The most significant aspect of § 1110 is that the 
transportation equipment provisions are extended to cover all business entities filing 
under chapter 11. Under the former law, only financers of equipment for corporations 
filing under chapter X were protected. 
76. 11 U.S.C. 5 569 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
77. Id. § 723. 
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ter XI1 specified that the debtor and certain classes of creditors 
could file plans but the plan could only affect certain types of 
debt.78 Again, disclosure of information to creditors was usually 
limited. 
The new eligibility requirements, by contrast, are not de- 
pendent upon the chapter proceeding utilized. Instead, the Re- 
form Act establishes uniform criteria, governed in part by 
whether a trustee has been appointed or the debtor has been left 
in possession. The debtor may file a plan with the petition or a t  
anytime thereafter, regardless of whether the petition was volun- 
tary or invol~ntary.~~ When no trustee has been appointed, the 
debtor alone has the right to file a plan for 120 days after the 
relief order is issued. If he files a plan within that time he has an 
additional sixty days to obtain acceptances. If he fails to do so, 
any party in interest may thereafter file a plan. Conversely, 
where a trustee has been appointed, any party in interest includ- 
ing the debtor, creditors, trustee, or creditor's committee may 
file a plan.80 
Since the debtor will usually retain possession, he will be 
granted this exclusive right to file for the given period of time. 
While this is similar to chapters XI and XII under the 'former 
act, the Reform Act goes a step further by placing a time limit 
on that right. This limit should serve to make the debtor more 
willing to negotiate and accommodate his creditors. 
b. What claims may the plan affect? The new rules regard- 
ing what debts the plan may affect are regarded as among the 
most significant changes found in the Reform Ad, and are ex- 
pected to have an important impact on plan formulation, credi- 
tor participation and treatment, and rehabilitation success.81 
Under the former act, one of the key criteria in determining 
which chapter a debtor was to select was the nature of the 
claims to be affected. For example, the proper action for a corpo- 
ration seeking reorganization of secured debt was to proceed 
under chapter X. But the threat of an ouster of the debtor's 
management in favor of an independent trustee, the length of 
the process, and the imposition of the absolute priority rule 
caused many debtors to avoid chapter X. Instead they relied on 
the less formal, but more limited chapter XI, even though the 
78. Id. 99  823, 866. 
79. 11 U.S.C.A. # 1121(a) (West 1979). 
80. Id. 9 1121(b), (c). 
81. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 34, at 579-80. 
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debtor's business might have been better rehabilitated through a 
plan affecting secured and unsecured debt.82 Chapter XII had 
other, equally unappealing limitations as an alternative to either 
chapter X or chapter XI, chief among which were the restrictions 
to real property security and the exclusion of corporations." 
In sharp contrast to the former act, the Reform Act avoids 
these chapter selection problems by providing in section 1123(b) 
that a plan may impair "any class of claims, secured or un- 
secured, or of interests." This change, together with the broader 
standards of eligibility, allows the plan of any eligible debtor to 
affect any debt, whether secured, unsecured, equity interest, 
public, or private. The plan may even amend the debtor's corpo- 
rate charter if neces~ary.~ The requirement that the plan be ac- 
cepted by the creditors and confirmed by the court should ade- 
quately protect the creditors' and stockholders' interests. These 
new guidelines for plan formulation emphasize negotiation, 
agreement, and informed consent of all parties in place of the 
more inflexible approach of the former act. The alterations 
should greatly increase the flexibility of the reorganization proce- 
dures, a primary goal enunciated by drafters of the Reform AcV5 
c. How may solicitation of acceptances be conducted? 
Once a plan has been formulated, it must be transmitted to 
holders of allowed claims or interests of each affected class for 
their acceptance or rejection. Specified percentages or numbers 
of individual claimants within each class must accept the plan 
before i t  may be submitted to the court for confirmation. 
The time and manner by which acceptance of a proposed 
plan could be solicited from a claimant varied widely among the 
former reorganization chapters. Chapter X required strict com- 
pliance with all SEC regulations governing an issue of securities. 
Chapters XI and XII, on the other hand, had little or no regula- 
tion as to when solicitation could be conducted or what had to 
be contained in the information given to claim or interest holders 
when acceptance was so l i~ i ted .~~ 
Chapter 11 standardizes the solicitation requirements 
82. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 5, at 247. While the 
chapter XI plan could not directly affect secured debt, it could indirectly affect it in 
various ways. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. The more prevalent use of chap- 
ter XI as compared to chapter X is reflected in the statistics in note 9 supra. 
83. See 11 U.S.C. $ 6  823, 866 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
84. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(a)(5)(1) (West 1979). 
85. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 223. 
86. See 11 U.S.C. $ $ 823, 866 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
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through the introduction of an entirely new standard." Any so- 
licitation after the commencement of a case must be accompa- 
nied by the plan or a summary of it plus a written disclosure 
statement approved by the court as containing "adequate infor- 
mation." Court approval does not require a valuation of the 
debtor nor of his assets. The disclosure statement itself may vary 
as between classes of claims, but must be the same as between 
members of the same class.88 
"Adequate information" is defined as that amount of infor- 
mation necessary to provide the typical investor of the solicited 
class with sufficient knowledge about the debtor and the plan to 
make an informed judgment about the acceptability of the plan. 
The adequacy of the disclosure statement is governed by bank- 
ruptcy law and not by SEC standards?@ 
The SEC is still expected to play an important role in the 
application of the new standard, however. Court approval of the 
disclosure statement is given only after notice and a hearing as 
to its adequacy, and the SEC and any other interested federal or 
state regulatory agency have an absolute right to appear a t  the 
hearing and express their views regarding the adequacy of the 
information. In this new role, the SEC becomes an advisor to the 
court regarding the adequacy of the protection afforded the pub- 
lic by the disclosure statement, but will not control the court's 
action in any particular case.s0 
87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1979). See also J. TROST, L. KING & K. KLEE, supra 
note 29, at 323. 
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)-(d) (West 1979). 
89. Id. 
90. A comparison with the previous law reveals a substantial alteration of the role of 
the SEC in a reorganization proceeding under the Reform Act. Section 1109(a) of the 
Reform A d  grants the SEC the right to "appear and be heard" on any issue in a chapter 
11 case, but it does not grant "party in interest" status to the SEC. This would prevent 
the SEC from appealing a court order. 
Although there is no direct grant of authority to object to the confirmation of a plan, 
as is given to a party in interest in § 1128(b), the report of the House Judiciary Commit- 
tee, H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, a t  409-11, expressly contemplates the SEC objecting 
to plans it feels do not disclose adequate information. Indeed, one of the keys to the 
workability of the adequate information standard of 9 1125 is SEC participation. The 
effectiveness of the SEC's participation would be only minimal if it did not have the 
ability to object. For cases involving pre-petition solicitation, the objection, if any, would 
take place at the confirmation hearing instead of, as normally contemplated for post- 
petition hearings, at the hearing on the plan. 
Chapter X of the former law accorded the SEC a much more substantial role. The 
SEC was given the responsibility for the protection of public investors. Public investors 
were assumed to have had too little control over the corporation or its officers and too 
little knowledge of its affairs to adequately protect their own interests. In addition, the 
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To further insure the independence of bankruptcy courts 
from SEC regulations, the Reform Act also contains a "safe har- 
bor" provision, which creates an exemption from regulations and 
laws governing the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of securities. 
This provision permits creditors and certain others to solicit or 
participate in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security 
offered or sold under the plan free from potential liability under 
the securities laws? 
The Reform Act distinguishes between solicitations made 
before and after the filing of a petition. Prior to commencement 
of a case, a solicitation must comply with any applicable 
nonbankruptcy regulations governing adequacy of disclosure, 
whether it  be SEC regulations or state securities regulations. 
Where none are applicable, as in the case of smaller business 
entities, a determination of the adequacy of the information dis- 
closed is made at the confirmation hearing. Any pre-petition so- 
licitation acceptances obtained in contravention of these stan- 
dards are simply not counted as acceptances of the plan.g2 
The purposes of the new standard are twofold. First, it is 
thought that if adequate disclosure is provided to all affected 
parties they will be able to make a sufficiently informed decision 
about the plan without having the SEC or the court render an 
opinion as to the "goodness" or "badness" of the plan.93 Second, 
the new standard increases the flexibility of the bankruptcy 
courts to save large amounts of money over the strict and often 
overly protective requirements of the SEC under chapter X, 
while at the same time providing greater protection to investors 
SEC was accorded party-in-interest status, and could act as an advisor to the court ei- 
ther at the court's request or with its approval. The SEC also performed an analysis of 
the debtor's business and the plan where total debt outstanding exceeded $3,000,000. If 
the total debt was less, and the court approved, the SEC could perform an analysis and 
file a report. This scrutiny of the plan was to guarantee the "fair and equitable" treat- 
ment of all parties. 
Under chapter XI, the SEC had a much less important role. Section 328 of the for- 
mer act, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1976) (repealed 1978), empowered the SEC (or any party in 
interest) to request a transfer of the proceeding from chapter XI to chapter X or to dis- 
miss the proceeding if the "needs to be served," General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 
U.S. 462, 466 (1956), showed that, a chapter X proceeding would be more appropriate. 
There was a presumption in favor of chapter X when readjustment of public debt was to 
be included in the plan. In chapter XII, of course, there was no SEC involvement. 
91. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 1125(e) (West 1979). See also H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 
408-10. 
92. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(b) (West 1979). 
93. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 226. 
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than was granted under chapters X or XII.D4 
d. What classes of interests must accept and what percent 
constitutes acceptance by the class? The Reform Act provides 
that each class of claims must either accept the plan or be 
unimpaired by it.D5 A class of creditors is deemed to have ac- 
cepted the plan when creditors "holding two-thirds in amount 
and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such 
class" have accepted it! A class of stockholders is deemed to 
have accepted the plan when two-thirds in amount of the al- 
lowed interests have consented to it?' 
These standards are more stringent than the requirements of 
the former reorganization chapters. In this particular aspect the 
Reform Act resembles a combination of chapters X and XI. 
Chapter X required acceptance by creditors holding two-thirds 
in amount of the claims filed in each class before the plan could 
be submitted to the court for its confirmation. Chapter XI re- 
quired acceptance by creditors holding one-half in amount and 
number of claims filed in each class. Neither required approval 
of stockholders .D8 
The requirement that one-half of the allowed claims of each 
class must accept the plan provides smaller creditors some pro- 
tection against the potential abuses of larger creditors. I t  also 
forces the debtor to provide in its plan for some degree of satis- 
94. Id. 
95. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(8) (West 1979). A claim is unimpaired if: (a) it is left 
unaltered as to any of claimant's rights; or (b) any default of debtor is cured, the matur- 
ity of the claim is reinstated, the creditor is compensated for any damages occurring as a 
result of default, and the rights of the claimant are not otherwise altered; or (c) the plan 
provides that the claimant receive cash equal to the allowed amount of the claim or the 
greater of any fixed liquidation preference allowed or the redemption value of the claim- 
ant's security. Id. § 1124. 
This essentially means that the plan's proponent may confirm it without the consent 
of a secured creditor by paying cash equal to the value of the secured party's collateral. 
Likewise, confirmation without an unsecured creditor's or stockholder's consent may be 
granted by paying cash equal to the greater of the liquidation value of the claim or the 
redemption value of the security held by the stockholder (as determined by the terms of 
the security). See In re Pine Gate Assocs., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. 
(CCH) 7 66,325 (N.D. Ga. 1976); J. TROST, L. KING & K. KLEE, supra note 29, a t  329-35. 
Note also that even if a class is impaired under the plan, its acceptance for confirmation 
purposes is still not mandatory if, after valuation of the debtor, that class retains no 
interest in the reorganized value of the business. 
96. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(c) (West 1979). Note that the two-thirds and one-half frac- 
tions are computed on the basis of two-thirds of the number of claims that were voted 
rather than the total number proceeding. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, a t  410. 
97. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(d) (West 1979). 
98. 11 U.S.C. §§  579, 762 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
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faction of the smaller or unsecured claimant in order to obtain 
their approval. A more equal treatment of creditors is thus likely 
to occur and greater participation by creditors is insured. 
In the event that not all of the impaired classes of creditors 
or equity security holders accept the plan offered by the propo- 
nent, the Reform Act incorporates but clarifies a "cramdown" 
provision formerly found only in chapters X and XI1 (the two 
least-used reorganization  chapter^).^^ Particular cramdown rules 
are found in section 1129 of the Reform Act. The first rule is that 
a t  least one class of claims must accept the plan before the court 
may confirm it.loO This requirement was adopted from the Senate 
version of the Act; "class," as used, would include creditors' 
claims or stockholders' interests. The "at least one class" provi- 
sion prevents the approval of a plan over the dissent of all 
classes. 
The second rule allows the court to confirm a plan over the 
dissent of a class upon a finding that the plan does not discrimi- 
nate unfairly and that it is "fair and equitable" with respect to 
each impaired, dissenting class. This means that if all classes 
accept the plan, the "best interests of the creditor" test is em- 
ployed to determine the fairness of the plan for confirmation 
purposes. But if a class dissents, the plan may only be confirmed 
over the dissenting class if the absolute priority rule ("fair and 
equitable" test) is applied to the dissenting class and all classes 
junior in priority thereto. The allowed amount of the claims of 
that class must be paid in full before any junior classes may 
share in the reorganization value of the business. The rule must, 
in turn, be applied in the same manner to each class of lesser 
priority. 
99. See id. § §  616(7), 861(11). 
100. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(10) (West 1979). 
101. I&. § 1129(b). Specifically, the rule is applied as follows: (a) secured creditors 
may have the plan confirmed over their objection if they are unimpaired or they receive 
property equal to the "allowed amount" of their secured claim valued as of the effective 
date of the plan. The "allowed amount" includes only up to the value of the property 
securing the claim, not the full amount of the claim if it exceeds the value of that prop- 
erty. Thus the statute focuses on claims, not creditors. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 
36, a t  415. "Property" includes both tangible and intangible property so that securities of 
the debtor, or the reorganized debtor if a valuation has been completed, may be given to  
the creditor as part of the property given. 
Unsecured creditors are subject to cramdown if the members of the class are 
unimpaired, if they will receive property equal to the allowed amount of their unsecured 
claims, or if no class junior to them will share in the reorganized business under the plan. 
This codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class down. 
As to stockholders, the court may confirm over the dissent of a class if it is 
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e. What standards must the court apply in determining 
whether or not to confirm the plan? As a final part of the confir- 
mation hearing, the court must make three findings independent 
of the acceptances of the plan by impaired parties. First, the 
court must find that each holder of a claim or interest within 
each class has either accepted the plan (which could provide 
more or less than the liquidated amount as long as there is an 
agreement to accept the amount provided) or that under the 
plan they will receive or retain property of a value not less than 
they would receive if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 
on the effective date of the plan.lo2 This standard, essentially a 
variation of the best interest test, applies to members of a class 
that have refused acceptance of the plan where the class has ac- 
cepted it by the required percentage and number. 
Second, the court must find that the confirmation of the 
plan is not likely to be followed by the subsequent liquidation of 
the business or the need for further financial reorganization of 
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan unless 
the plan so provides.lo3 Such a determination would require a 
close examination of the financial structure of the business,lo4 the 
cooperation of the creditors, the likelihood that the plan will ac- 
complish eventual rehabilitation, and perhaps even a considera- 
tion of the capability of the reorganized debtor's management. 
This standard is similar to the former chapter X feasibility stan- 
dardlo5 and is aimed at insuring the probable success of the reha- 
bilitation effort. By contrast, the standards of former chapters 
XI and XII were oriented more toward the creditors, and re- 
quired only the probability that the creditors would receive the 
amount provided for them by the plan. lo6 No direct consideration 
was given to the resulting viability of the reorganized debtor. 
Finally, upon the request of a governmental party, the court 
may not confirm the plan unless it finds that the principal pur- 
pose of the plan is not to avoid taxes or to avoid section 5 of the 
Securities Act of 1933.1°7 
f .  What is the effect of a confirmed plan? Once a plan has 
unimpaired, if it receives its liquidation preference or redemption rights, if any, or if no 
junior class in priority to it shares under the plan (applying the absolute priority rule). 
102. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 1129(a)(7)(A) (West 1979). 
103. Id. § 1129(a)(ll). 
104. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 34, at 605. 
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1976) (repealed 1978). 
106. See id. $9 766(2), 872(2). 
10'7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(d) (West 1979). 
982 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
been confirmed it is important to determine who is bound by the 
plan and what debtor obligations are discharged. I t  is also neces- 
sary to know the extent to which securities and those issuing the 
securities held or issued under the plan are exempt from other- 
wise applicable securities laws. 
Under the Reform Act, confirmation of a plan makes it 
binding upon the debtor, creditors, equity holders, partners, en- 
tities acquiring property under the plan, and entities issuing se- 
curities under the plan, whether or not the claimant or entity 
accepted the plan or was impaired by it.lo8 The property dealt 
with by the plan is at that point free and clear from all claims 
and interests of creditors, stockholders, partners, etc., unless the 
plan provides otherwise. The confirmation of a plan discharges 
the debtor from any debt arising before the order of relief.lO@ Un- 
less the plan indicates to the contrary, the confirmation also op- 
erates to terminate all rights and interests of stockholders and 
general partners provided by the plan.ll@ 
There are, however, two exceptions to the general discharge 
provisions. First, a confirmed plan will not discharge an individ- 
ual from debts that could not be discharged if there were no re- 
organization plan? Second, there can be no discharge of debts 
under a plan if the plan liquidates the debtor's assets and the 
debtor would be denied discharge in a liquidation proceeding 
pursued under section 727 of the Reform Act.l12 
Despite areas where the purposes of the bankruptcy and se- 
curities laws coincide,lt3 the rigidity of the securities laws may 
often thwart the intended flexibility of the Reform Act. In such 
areas of conflict, one desirable effect of a confirmed plan is that 
it provides exemptions from certain aspects of securities laws.l14 
Traditionally, these exemptions have been limited to the initial 
108. Id. 9 1141(a). 
109. Discharge does not relieve the debtor of debts that may be incurred during the 
reorganization process, whether in operation of the business or in the funding of the plan. 
110. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 1141(d) (West 1979). 
111. Id. 9 1141(d)(2). 
112. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 418-19. Section 727 grants discharge except 
where fraud, concealment, waste, or other wrongdoing on the part of the debtor is found, 
which would indicate that the debtor was using the bankruptcy laws for the purpose of 
avoiding his obligations. 
113. See Comment, SEC Intervention in Corporate Rehabilitation, 56 NEB.  L. REV. 
635, 639 (1977). 
114. For a discussion of one area of conflict involving the question of whether the 
solicitation of acceptances may constitute an offer of a security, see notes 86-91 and ac- 
companying text supra. 
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transaction, and not to resale or redistribution. This has 
presented several problems, especially when the reorganized 
debtor attempted to issue or sell securities already contained in 
its portfolio under the confirmed plan. If the securities are not 
exempt, a creditor receiving those securities may fall within the 
SEC classification of an underwriter, and resale would violate 
section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.115 The SEC has also ar- 
gued that small classes of creditors receive securities of the 
debtor under a "private placement" category that limits their 
resale to not more than one percent every six months after an 
initial waiting period of two years, unless the securities are regis- 
tered prior to resale.l16 
The former act tended to inhibit the success of the bank- 
ruptcy plan by providing too little protection for creditors who 
accepted securities as part of the reorganization. Especially in a 
cramdown, the creditor might have had no choice but to take the 
securities and would have consequently been limited to a two- 
year waiting period, after which he could sell only a small per- 
centage of the total at any one time. Creditors were often forced 
to take securities, but were able to realize very little on their 
claims because of the resale limitations. 
This situation is alleviated under the Reform Act by the ex- 
emption from securities laws of the issuance of certificates of in- 
debtedness (other than equity securities) and the issuance of se- 
curities where they are given primarily in exchange for claims 
against the debtor or equity securities of the debtor. The exercise 
of any conversion privilege attached to such securities is also 
exempt .l17 
The Reform Act also provides a transactional exemption for 
the sale by the debtor of securities of another nonaffiliated coipo- 
ration that he holds in his own stock portfolio on the date the 
petition is filed, if the sale is conducted pursuant to a confirmed 
plan. Other conditions are that the issuer of such stock must file 
reports pursuant to section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
l934,ll8 that the issuer be in compliance with all applicable re- 
quirements for trading that stock, and that the sale not exceed 
115. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 419-21. If the creditor takes more than 1% of 
the securities with a view to distribution, he would, under Q 5 of the Securities Act of 
1933, fall into the category of an underwriter. See 15 U.S.C. Q 77(e) (1976). 
116. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 237. 
117. 11 U.S.C.A. Q 1145 (West 1979). 
118. See 15 U.S.C. 9 78(m) (1976). 
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four percent of the total amount of the class of securities out- 
standing. If the debtor desires to sell more than the four percent 
limit, he must first sell four percent and then wait two years 
before selling additional blocks of one percent at six-month 
intervals.llg 
The Reform Act also limits the definition of an underwriter 
for bankruptcy purposes. The current definition of underwriter in 
section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 does not apply to cred- 
itors who take debtor's securities with a view to distribution.120 If 
it did apply, the creditor would be forced to register the sale of a 
debtor's securities or find another exemption. This exemption is 
limited to a creditor who receives less than ten percent of such 
securities, since with ten percent he becomes a "control person" 
within the meaning of the Securities Act. Where the debtor is- 
sues securities, the disclosure statement is used in place of the 
prospectus. lZ1 
An offer or sale of securities under the plan is characterized 
by the Reform Act as a public offering rather than a private of- 
feringlZ2 in order to prevent application of the restrictions of a 
private offering under rule 144 of the SEC. 
IV. THE PRACTITIONER'S VIEW OF THE REFORM ACT 
For the most part, bankruptcy practice under the former 
act, and especially that portion regarding business reorganiza- 
tion, was left to those few members of the bar specializing in the 
field.lZ3 This situation was generally attributed to the complexity 
of the reorganization chapters and cases.lu The effect of this ex- 
clusive practice was the emergence of an exclusive "bankruptcy 
bar," which consisted of a relatively small group of attorneys 
wh'o could and often did represent more than one party in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, despite potential conflicts of interest.'= 
This situation tended to increase lawyer control at the expense of 
party participation, especially by creditors. It also tended to 
minimize the effectiveness of the attorney's service to his clients 
119. 11 U.S.C.A. 6 1145(a)(3) (West 1979). 
120. Id. 8 1145(b)(l), (2). 
121. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 238. 
122. 11 U.S.C.A. 6 1145(e) (West 1979). 
123. Anderson, supra note 39, at 203. 
124. Id. 
125. Surbin & Rugheimer, A Statistical Study of Bankruptcy in Massachusetts, 
With Emphasis on the Bankruptcy Bar and an Examination of the Roposed Banlzruptcy 
Acts, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 154-59 (1976). 
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in his traditional role as an advocate in an adversary system. 
Such situations almost inevitably lead to abuses by a few 
attorneys. 
Many of these problems will be alleviated under chapter 11 
of the Reform Act. The consolidation of the reorganization chap- 
ten, together with the simplification and modernization of pro- 
cedures, will allow a greater number of lawyers to participate in 
bankruptcy practice without the need of specialization in the 
field. In addition, the Reform Act requires "disinterestedness," 
thereby preventing a single attorney from representing two or 
more parties in most cases.12e Such a requirement will motivate 
the attorney to more actively represent his client's interests since 
he will not be faced with the conflicting interests of other clients 
in the same proceeding. A tangential advantage to the bar is the 
possibility that the quicker, simpler process of bankruptcy may 
attract more beleaguered business debtors, who have previously 
regarded bankruptcy reorganization as a last resort simply be- 
cause of the time and expense involved.lf7 
Finally, it is important to consider the potential improve- 
ment of public relations the bar may enjoy as a result of stream- 
lined, more serviceable bankruptcy legislation. The Reform Act 
will undoubtedly serve the public better, and clients involved in 
bankruptcy proceedings-either as debtors or creditors-will re- 
tain better impressions of their own counsel and the entire bar. 
The consolidation of all reorganization chapters into a single 
chapter under the Reform Act will have a marked beneficial im- 
pact. The benefits should be fairly immediate, but will increase 
as the bar becomes familiar with its improvements and the ad- 
vantages available to their clients. Perhaps the greatest advan- 
tages will be the simplicity of approach and the greatly increased 
flexibility granted the parties. The effort to successfully rehabili- 
tate a potentially viable debtor is not limited by unnecessary re- 
quirements. These charaeteristics will better enable the bank- 
ruptcy system to fulfill the purposes of bankruptcy legislation. 
As with any extensive change in legislation, the implemen- 
tation of the Reform Act may reveal some defects. But whatever 
126. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (West 1979). 
127. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4 ,  at 436 (statement of Patrick 
A. Murphy). 
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the defects, the Reform Act will likely be a major improvement 
over its predecessor chapters. 
Don J. Miner 
